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ABSTRACT
A defining characteristic of bank loans is that they are not resold once created. Yet, in 1989 about
$240 billion of commercial and industrial loans were sold, compared to trivial amounts five years
earlier. Selling loans without explicit guarantee or recourse is inconsistent with theories of the existence
of financial intermediation. What has changed to make bank loans marketable? In this paper we test
for the presence of implicit contractual features of bank loan sales contract that could explain this
inconsistency. In addition, the effect of technological progress on the reduction of information
asymmetries between loan buyers and loan sellers is considered. The paper tests for the present of 3
these features and effects using a sample of over 800 recent loan sales. t
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I. Introduction
In the last decade a market for selling commercial and industrial bank loans has
opened. Since bank loans were previously nonmarketable, this innovation in banking is
of critical importance to both academic economists and public policy makers. The
existence of this new market challenges recent theories of financial intermediation which
would predict that loan selling would be a 'lemons' market. Loan sales also contradict
the presumption that bank loans are illiquid, which is the underlying rationale for much
of bank regulation and Central Bank policy. Yet, little is known about this new market
for loans, in part due to a lack of data. In this essay we use a sample of over 800
individual loan sales to investigate the nature of loan sales contracts.
Commercial and industrial loan sales grew tremendously during the 1980s. As
Table 1 indicates, the outstanding amount of commercial and industrial loan sales
increased from approximately $26.7 billion in the second quarter of 1983 to a peak of
$290.9 billion in the third quarter of 1989. This growth has been accompanied by signs
of a developing market. In the early stages of the market, the loans sold were very short
maturity claims on the cash flows of loans to well-known firms. However, as the loan
sales market has grown, the loans sold have increasingly represented claims on riskier
firms. Now less than half the loans sold are the obligations of investment-grade firms.
There is also evidence that the maturities of loan sales contracts have increased. In 1985,
80 percent of the loan sales had maturities of 90 days or less, while by mid- 1987, over
half had maturities exceeding one year.
A commercial loan sale or secondary loan participation is a contract under which a
See Gorton and Haubrich (1989) for a complete description of the development and
regulation of the loan sales market.
bank sells a proportional (equity) claim to all or part of the cash flow from an individual
loan to a third party buyer. The contract transfers no rights or obligations between the
bank and the borrower, so the third party buyer has no legal relationship with the bank's
borrower. Since many loans sales involve obligations of nonpublicly traded firms, third
party buyers, most of whom are other banks, must rely upon the credit assessment of the
originating bank. In addition, bank regulations require that the originating bank not give
any type of loan guarantee to the loan buyer, if the originating bank wishes to remove
the loan from its balance sheet. In other words, the loan buyer has no recourse to the
selling bank should a loan default occur.
Loan sales appear paradoxical because commercial bank lending is thought to involve
the financing of nonmarketable assets. The theory of financial intermediation explains
that the (publicly unobserved) credit evaluation and monitoring services provided by
banks require, for incentive compatibility, that the bank hold the loans it creates.
Holding loans until maturity insures that the bank has incentive to effectively evaluate
and monitor borrowers. If loans were sold, then the bank would lack the incentive to
produce an efficient level of credit information and monitoring since it would not receive
the rewards from this activity. Loan buyers would recognize this lack of incentive and
value the loan lower than otherwise. Therefore, the existence of financial intermediaries
implies the creation of bank loans which banks should be unable to sell.2
The previous inability of banks to sell loans has historically been at the root of
deposit insurance and bank regulation. The non-marketability of bank loans is often
The explanations for the existence of financial intermediaries offered by Boyd and
Prescott (1986), Campbell and Kracaw (1980), and Diamond (1984) all have the implication
that the assets created by these firms cannot be resold.
taken to imply that bank depositors have a difficult time valuing loans. It has been
argued that such an information asymmetry between banks and depositors is a
precondition for banking panics.3 If a large number of depositors seek to withdraw cash
from their banks, then banks will be insolvent if there is no market to sell their assets.
Thus, the illiquidity inherent in bank assets is one justification for government deposit
insurance (and the Federal Reserve discount window). If a well-developed market for
bank loans existed, then the rationale for bank regulation would not exist.
Loan sales are not merely underwriting which involves no special information
production or monitoring services by banks. In fact, most loans that are currently sold
are those of firms which have no commercial paper rating. (See Gorton and Haubrich
(1989).) In addition, absent any services provided by banks, from an investor's point of
view a direct claim on the firm would dominate the indirect claim of a loan sale. Should
the firm fail, the direct claim allows the holders rights which the indirect claim precludes.
The advent of the loan sales market led to a number of papers which address banks'
motivation for selling loans. Pennacchi (1988) shows that loan sales can provide a lower
cost method of financing loans for those banks which face a competitive deposit market.
By raising funds via loan sales, costs associated with required reserves and required bank
capital can be avoided. James (1988) points out that loan sales can mitigate an "under-
investment" problem for banks with previously issued risky debt. Flannery (1989)
demonstrates that bank examination procedures create incentives for banks to hold only
certain classes of loans, profitably selling the remainder. Boyd and Smith (1989) explain
For example, Diamond and Dybvig (1983) assume that there is a cost to the bank of
liquidating long term investments. The cost is presumably motivated by the idea that such
assets are nonmarketable. In Gorton (1985, 1986) banking panics are caused by depositor
confusion over bank asset values.
loan sales in terms of efficient allocation of resources across banks specializing in
different types of lending.
In this paper, we attempt focus on the nature of the contract between a bank and a
loan buyer. In particular, we ask what contract features could, if enforceable, explain
how the loan sales market is incentive-compatible. Without recourse, credit
enhancement, contractual guarantees, or insurance, it is not obvious why loan sales are
incentive-compatible. Moreover, the contract itself has not changed for at least fifty
years; it is a standard secondary participation contract. But, this does not mean that no
innovation has occurred. Since the regulatory authorities restrict the explicit contracts
that banks may write, contract innovation may be implicit. Our first goal is attempt to
empirically detect the presence of these (unobservable) contractual arrangements
between banks and loan buyers which, if enforceable, could explain how the loan sales
market is incentive-compatible. Our second goal is to test hypotheses about how implicit
contractual features could be enforced.
We consider two possible implicit contract features which could explain the existence
of loan sales. The first feature is the possibility of a bank offering an implicit guarantee
on the value of the loan sold to the loan buyer. Restrictions prevent banks from
inserting explicit loan guarantees in loan sales contracts. However, at times banks do
repurchase loans from loan buyers. If a loan buyer expects the originating bank to buy
back those loans which have deteriorated in value, a means of providing de facto loan
guarantees would exist. Gorton and Pennacchi (1989), using loan sales yields averaged
across a sample of banks, find very weak evidence of implicit bank guarantees on loan
Other related papers include Benveniste and Berger (1987), Cumming (1987),
Greenbaum and Thakor (1987), and Kareken (1987).
sales. In this study, not only are the data not averaged, but much more detailed deal-
specific data are available.
The second feature is a bank's choice of selling only part of a loan, retaining
the rest, so that the bank retains some incentive to maintain the loan's value. The
greater the portion of the loan held by the bank, the greater will be its incentive to
evaluate and monitor the borrower. Notably, no participation contract requires that the
bank selling the loan maintain a fraction, so this contract feature would have to be
enforced by market, rather than legal, means.
How could implicit contractual features be enforced? Loan sales would be incentive-
compatible if the fundamental assumption that there is an information asymmetry
between banks and outsiders, either depositors or loan buyers, has been reduced or
eliminated by technological change. That is, loan sales are incentive-compatible if the
loan buyer can verify whether the originating bank has effectively evaluated and
monitored the borrower. This would enable the loan buyer to observe the bank's
behavior, so that the potential moral hazard problem linked to loan selling can be
averted. The originating bank can be induced to monitor borrowers in an efficient
manner. The fact that most loan buyers are other banks, mostly foreign banks and
smaller domestic banks, makes this feature plausible if one believes that banks might
have a comparative advantage in monitoring the behavior of other banks. Recent
improvements in technology that have lowered banks' cost of gathering and transmitting
information would suggest that this feature could now be feasible. Our final test
examines the hypothesis that asymmetric information has been reduced or eliminated.
In order to relate observable data to the presence of unobservable contract features,
we develop a model of the loan sales market. The model is one in which banks can
improve the distribution of loan returns by monitoring, but the level of monitoring by the
bank may not be observed by loan buyers. The bank's problem is to choose the optimal
fraction of the loan to be sold, its level of monitoring, and the fraction of the loan to be
implicitly guaranteed. A key assumption is that implicit guarantees are costly because of
regulatory constraints. The model provides a relationship between observable variables
which we then test using a large sample of loan sales done by a money center bank.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section II the data are introduced and some
preliminary empirical analysis is performed. Section III introduces the model of loan
sales and derives the equations to be estimated. In Section IV, a series of tests are
carried out under the assumption that loan buyers cannot verify the monitoring services
of the loan selling bank. In Section V, we provide more empirical analysis that attempts
to test the proposition that loan buyers can verify the activities of the loan selling bank.
Section VI concludes.
II. An Overview of the Data
Since little is known about the loan sales market, it is worthwhile examining the data
which will be used subsequently. The data analyzed in this paper are a sample of 872
individual loan sales done by a major money center bank during the period January 20,
1987 to September 1, 1988. The bank is one of the largest loan sellers.
Table 2 presents some descriptive statistics about the data sample. Included are the
mean values of the maturity of the underlying loans, the maturity of the loan sales, the
fraction of the loan sold, and the interest rates on the loan, loan sale, and LIBOR. Note
that the average difference between the yield on the loan and the yield on the loan sale
is approximately 12 basis points. This is very close to the average spread of 13 basis
points that was found for money center banks during a June 1987 Senior Loan Officer
Survey of Bank Lending Practices performed by the Federal Reserve Board of
Governors. We also constructed a variable to measure the probability of the bank's
failure, which will be useful in our empirical analysis. The level and volatility of the
bank's stock market value was used to infer this failure probability. A description of the
method used to construct this variable is given in the Appendix. The data also include
the borrower's commercial paper rating, if any, but not the identity of the borrower
(which was not provided to us).
Table 3 presents another summary of the data. It stratifies loan sales by maturity
and commercial paper rating. For each commercial paper rating, and maturity category,
the table provides the average size of the loan sale, the number of observations, the
fraction of all observations falling into that cell, and the fraction of the total dollar
volume of sales with the particular maturity having that rating. Notably, the largest
categories of sales (by number, but also by dollar volume) are those with maturities of 6-
15 days and 'No Rating,' and 16-30 days and 'No Rating.' These two categories account
for almost 47 percent of all loan sales. The next largest category is 31-60 days and 'No
Rating' which accounts for ten percent of the total. Thus, these three categories account
for over half the total sales. This is consistent with the earlier observation that loan sales
may not simply be a substitute for commercial paper.5
Table 4 summarizes data that relates the spread of the yield on the loan sold over
Notably, during this period this bank made no loan sales with maturities greater than
one year. In this respect, the bank is not representative, since the mean maturity of loan
sales during the period was approximately one year. See Gorton and Haubrich (1989). The
likely explanation for the shorter average maturities in our sample is that none of the bank's
loan sales involved merger related financing, since these types of loans tend to have
maturities in the range of five years.
8LIBOR and the spread of the yield on the loan negotiated with the borrower over
LIBOR to the maturity of the loan and the rating of the borrower. Also given is the
average fraction of each type of loan that the originating bank sells. Casual observation
of Table 4 implies that spreads generally increase as the borrower's rating declines and
also, perhaps, as the loan maturity lengthens. Also, the fraction of the loan sold by the
bank appears to decline with maturity, holding the rating constant. However, there does
not appear to be much relationship between the fraction sold and the rating of the
borrower, holding maturity constant.
Gorton and Pennacchi (1989) hypothesized that the spread of the loan sale over
LIBOR should be positively related to the risk of the borrowing firm's loan, but
negatively related to a possible (implicit) loan sale guarantee by the loan selling bank.
This simple relationship can be tested if we make the following two assumptions. First,
that the spread of the loan over LIBOR is a measure of the risk of the borrower's loan
and second, that the (implicit) loan sale guarantee by the bank becomes less valuable the
higher is the probability of the bank's failure. The idea behind the second assumption is
that if the bank which originates the loan becomes insolvent, it will not be able to fulfill
its implicit guarantee to the loan buyer. Hence, ceteris paribus, we would expect that the
spread of the loan sale over LIBOR should be positively related to the probability of the
The following OLS regression supports these observations. Letting fr = the fraction
of the loan sale retained by the bank, maturity = the maturity (in days) of the loan, and rate
= {4 if no rating, 3 if A3, 2 if A2, 1 if Al, and if A1 + }, we have:
fr =.17890 + .00151 maturity + .00742 rate
(.02965) (.00046) (.00762)
No. of Obs. = 872, R2 = .012. (Standard errors in parentheses.)
Thus, point estimates suggest the fraction retained increases with maturity and the risk of
the rating, but only the maturity variable is significant.
bank's failure. The following OLS regression tests this hypothesis. (Standard errors are
in parentheses.)
r
ls
- r
f
= .00061 + .23551 (rb - rf) + .00684 pfail
(.00004) (.01196) (.05122)
No. of Observations = 872. R2 = .311.
where r
ls
-r
f
is the spread on the loan sale over LIBOR, rb-rf is the spread on the loan to
the borrower over LIBOR, and pfail is the probability of the bank failing by the maturity
of the loan.
The loan sale spread is significantly positively related to the spread paid by the
borrowing firm. However, while the coefficient on pfail is of the expected positive sign, it
is insignificantly different from zero. This simple test seems to indicate little evidence of
implicit loan sale guarantees. However, banks might choose to give guarantees on some
loans and not on others. Without a model of the bank's choice of loan guarantees, this
issue may not be resolved. In addition, the regression ignores the possible effects on the
risk of the loan sale of the bank retaining a fraction of the loan.
To see how the fraction of the loan sold by the bank might relate to the spread on
the loan sale, we repeat the above regression adding the fraction sold, denoted by b, to
the right hand side of the regression equation.
rk - rf = .00098 + .23877 (rb -rf) + .00787 pfail - .00051 b
(.00009) (.01182) (.05057) (.00010)
No of Observations = 872. R2 = .329.
A higher fraction of the loan sold is significantly related to a lower spread on the loan
1U
sale. This might seem counter-intuitive, since one could reason that the greater the
fraction of the loan sold, the more likely is the bank to monitor the borrower
inefficiently, and hence the greater should be the spread on the loan sold. But this logic
ignores possible reverse casualty. Profit maximizing banks may choose to sell larger
fractions of less risky loans, those loans that require less monitoring, because by doing so
the yield paid by loan buyers will not rise significantly. The reported negative relation
between the fraction of the loan sold and the spread paid by loan buyers could be
picking up this effect.
Clearly, in order to sort out this issue as well as the issue of which loans banks may
choose to guarantee, we need to develop a model of bank optimizing behavior. This is
the goal of the next section. It will prepare the way for further empirical tests.
III. A Model of the Loan Sales Market
This section presents a model of the optimal contract between banks and loan
buyers. We allow the contract to possibly involve a number of implicit features. The
goal is to determine the optimal combination of contract features consistent with
incentive compatibility and bank profit maximization. This model will then provide the
framework for more detailed empirical work.
The model extends the analysis in Pennacchi (1988) to allow the possibility of banks
granting implicit guarantees to loan buyers. It considers a setting where banks have an
incentive to sell loans in order to avoid the costs of required reserves and required
capital associated with issuing bank deposits and equity. Banks can improve the
More generally, the model of loan sales applies to any situation where the bank's
internal financing is costly. For example, agency costs, rather than reserve and equity
restrictions might motivate loan sales.
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expected return on loans by monitoring borrowers. We first adopt the standard
assumption that bank monitoring is unobservable so that banks and loan buyers cannot
write contracts that are contingent on the level of monitoring. Therefore, loan sales
involve a moral hazard problem, namely, that the bank may not monitor at the most
efficient level after having sold its loans. However, we will later directly test this
assumption of asymmetric information to consider the possibility that loan buyers might
have the ability to verify the monitoring activities of the originating bank.
If bank monitoring is unobservable, the consequent moral hazard problem can be
mitigated by contractual features not directly concerned with the level of monitoring.
Because of regulation, these contract features would have to be implicit. We consider
two features of the loan sale arrangement which could be contractually feasible. One
feature is an agreement by the bank to sell only a portion of the loan, retaining the
remainder on its balance sheet. The second feature is an implicit guarantee by the bank
to repurchase the loan at a previously agreed upon price if the quality of the loan
deteriorates. We interpret this second feature as equivalent to a (partial) guarantee
against default on the loan sale. These two contract features can make loan sales
incentive compatible because banks retain some of the risk of loan defaults. Therefore,
they would still face incentives to monitor, even though some or all of the loan has been
sold.
The bank's problem is to maximize the expected profits from the sale of a particular
o
loan. The following assumptions are made about the loan characteristics and possible
contract features.
^his problem is separable from the bank's choice of loan origination. See Pennacchi
(1988) for analysis of the initial loan portfolio choice.
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(Al) A bank loan requires one dollar of initial financing, and produces a stochastic
return of x at the end of r periods, where xG[0,L] and where L is the promised
end-of-period repayment on the loan. The return, x, has a cumulative distribution
function of F(x,a), where a is the level of monitoring by the bank. This distribution
function satisfies
F(x,Xa+(l-X)a') < XF(x,a) + (l-A)F(x,a'), for all a,a'; XG(0,1).
(A2) The bank has a constant returns to scale technology for monitoring loans.
The cost function is given by c(a) = c-a.
(A3) The bank can sell a fraction, b, of the return on a loan where b£[0,l],
retaining the portion (1-b). Risk neutral loan buyers require an expected return on
in
loans purchased of r
f
. The bank finances its portion with a weighted average cost
of deposit and equity financing given by rj.
(A4) The bank can offer an implicit (partial) guarantee against the default of a
loan that it sells. Let v refer to the proportion of a loan sale that the bank
promises to guarantee, where yE[0,l]. Such implicit guarantees carry a potential
regulatory cost, with the expected cost to the bank given by k(v), where k' > and
k" > 0. The bank can fulfill this guarantee only if it is solvent at the time the loan
matures. The probability the bank is solvent, p, is assumed to be uncorrected with
the return on the loan.
Assumptions (Al) and (A2) provide a real role for banks, namely, as improving the
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expected returns on loans by costly monitoring. Assumption (A3) constrains the form
of the explicit loan sale contract to that of a proportional equity split between the bank
and the loan buyer. This assumption is due to regulatory constraints which prevent other
contract forms in selling commercial and industrial loans. The cost of implicit
guarantees, specified in (A4) derives from regulatory pressure. Banks are not allowed to
offer explicit guarantees, i.e., they must sell loans without recourse in order to remove
them from the balance sheet.
The optimal loan sales contract involves the bank choosing a level of monitoring, a,
the fraction of the loan to be sold, b, and the fraction of the loan to be implicitly
guaranteed, v.
L (1)
2JJ / [(!-*>)*
- byp(L-x)] dF(x,a) - c(a) -k(y) - e''*I
•Y
<
where
7 = 1- e"? f[bx + byp(L-x)] dF(x,a)
subject to
HTiat the existence of financial intermediaries can be explained by their role as monitors
was first explained by Diamond (1984). Also, see Gorton and Haubrich (1987).
^Tie constraints include restrictions on the form of a loan sale that enables a bank to
remove the loan from its balance sheet, thereby avoiding reserve and capital requirements.
Also, loan sales contracts must avoid the appearance of being "securities" in order to avoid
securities laws. These issues are discussed by Gorton and Haubrich (1989).
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(0 f{l-b + byp)xdFe(x,a) = c'(a)
(ii)
b <. 1
("0 Y * 1
In problem (1), the first term in the bank's objective function is the expected return on
the portion of the loan return held by the bank minus the expected value of the
guarantee the bank gives to the loan buyer. I is the amount of internal (bank deposit
and equity) funding which the bank provides when fraction b of the loan is sold.
Constraint (i) is the incentive compatibility constraint. Hart and Holmstrom (1986) show
that it can be written in this form when the distribution function, F(x,a), satisfies the
convexity-of-distribution-function condition given in (Al).
Define 6 = exp[(rj - r
f
)r] - 1 to be the excess cost of internal bank finance relative to
financing at the riskfree rate. Then the first order conditions with respect to the bank's
choices of b, a, and y are
{Qx(a) + yp6[L-x(a)] - X(l-yp)x
a
- \i)b = (2)
{ [1 + b(l-yp)d]x a - c'{a) + MO-Kl-YP))^ " *"(*)] >« = <3 )
ibpQ[L-x(a)] - *'(y) + Xbpx
a
- e}y = (4 )
where X, \i, and e are the Lagrange multipliers associated with constraints (i), (ii), and
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(iii), respectively and where
x(a) = fxdF(x,a)
with subscripts referring to partial differentiation with respect to a.
If b and y are positive in equilibrium, i.e., at least some of the loan is sold and a
partial guarantee is given, then equations (2) and (4) can be combined to yield the
following relation between the optimal choice of b and y.
b _
(fc'W+eXl-yp) (5)
/>(6L-u)
In addition, using the functional form c(a) = ca assumed in (A2), we can substitute
the incentive compatibility constraint, (i), into equation (3) to eliminate c. The resulting
expression can be used to eliminate k in equation (2). This allows us to obtain the
relationship between the bank's optimal share of the loan to sell and its optimal level of
monitoring, given a partial guarantee of y.
b=
Q[x{a)^p{L-~x{a))}-\ilL
" 2
ax- _ (6)
(1
-Y/>)[—^-(1 -Y/>)d +Q)+Q[x(a)+yp(L-x(a))]-VL/L]
**m
The equilibrium relations in (5) and (6) will provide the basis of our first set of
empirical tests. However, as currently written, equation (6) depends on the unobserved
level and derivatives of the expected return on the loan, x (a). These expressions can be
replaced by observable variables or estimable parameters. First, we can substitute for
16
IT(a) by noting that it is directly related to the yield on the loan sold and the fraction of
the loan guaranteed. Since the continuously compounded yield on the loan sale, rk , is
given by
rb -
-Jln(yJ) V)
where 1-1 is the amount a loan buyer pays to purchase a share, b, of the loan such that
the buyer's expected return equals r
f
. Substituting for I from problem (1) into equation
(7) and rearranging, we obtain
-m , *-
1"-*
- na (8)
1 - Y/7
Second, in order to evaluate the ratio x
a
/ x aa ,
we need to make an explicit assumption
regarding the effect of monitoring on a given loan's expected return. We assume the
parametric form 11
x(a) = U\ - ae-**) (9)
An implication of this function form is
The parameters a and /3 are assumed to be positive and loan specific. The parameter
a is also assumed to be less than unity. Note that if no monitoring is done, the expected
return is L(l-a). The parameter /3 is a measure of the marginal increase in expected return
on the loan from additional monitoring. The assumed function implies that as the level of
monitoring rises to infinity, the expected return on the loan asymptotes to the promised
payment, L, with the speed determined by the parameter /3.
17
x *£ = Lae-*a = L - x(a) ( 10 )
<z ' aa
This expression, as well as equation (8), can then be used to simplify equation (6) as
follows.
b =
«'~(ru
"?X
- M (11)
(1 - yp)[l + 6 - e
<r"-r* - ji/I]
r, - r
f
- u./(tI)
(1 - Y/>)[^/
- r/ + ris- r/- H/(tI.)]
Hence we see that when b is less than one, so that u. = 0, the fraction of the loan
sold is approximately proportional to the ratio of the excess cost of internal financing
(over the risk free rate) to the excess cost of internal financing plus the excess cost of
funds received from the loan sale. Thus for a given loan sale guarantee, if the
equilibrium yield on the loan sale greatly exceeds the risk free rate, the bank will be
selling a smaller fraction of the loan it originates.
Equations (11) and (5) are two conditions that define relationships between the
bank's optimal choice of b and y. Given a parametric assumption regarding the
guarantee cost function, k(y), in equation (5), the equilibrium values of b and y can be
determined. However, if one assumes that the bank is constrained to give the same
partial guarantee, y, for all the loans it sells, then equation (11) is sufficient to determine
the bank's optimal share of each loan sold given this guarantee. We illustrate this point
in the first part of the next section.
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IV. A Test of Implicit Guarantees on Loan Sales
The first of our empirical tests will make the assumption that the loan selling bank
has a policy of making an identical implicit (partial) guarantee, v, for each loan that it
sells. Later, we will change this assumption to allow the bank to optimize over the value
of y so that it will make different implicit guarantees on each loan sold.
A) Equal Guarantees on All Loan Sales
If the loan selling bank's partial guarantee, y, is the same for each loan, then it can
be treated as a parameter and estimated using a relationship similar to equation (11).
As a means of empirically implementing our model, we assume that the natural logarithm
of the proportion of a loan sold equals the natural logarithm of the right hand side of
equation (11) plus a normally distributed error term. Our hope is that this error term
can capture the influence of missing factors, assumed to be uncorrelated with the right
hand side of (11), that determine the proportion of each loan sold. Because the natural
log of the fraction of the loan sold, b, has a range between minus infinity and zero,
equation (11) with an appended error describes a Tobit model. Defining b* as a latent
variable for loan sale i, and bj
as the observed variable (fraction sold) for loan sale i, we have
19
ln(V) H ^ \ J " ln(l-YP) + 1, s ^(Y) fl, ( 12a)
6, = ft,* (/()<;&.* si (12b)
ft. = 1 if 1 * ft,* (12c)
where 17^ ~ N(m,c72 ). Since the fraction of the loan sold, bj, can at most be one, so that
ln^) can at most be zero, the Tobit model is censored at bj = 1. Therefore, the
12
likelihood function is given by
,_, i ln(fc.)-m-z,) „ m+Zi ,,„v
n -<k——-)n n(—L) < 13 )
where 4> is the standard normal probability density function.
Recall that 6 = exp[(rj - r
f
)r] - 1, so that the right hand side of (12a) is a function of
rj, the weighted average cost of deposit and equity finance, which is assumed to be the
marginal cost of the bank's internal financing. If the bank's equity capital constraint is
binding, n takes the form
T, =
Vd-O + O, (14)
7 Wd-P)
For example, see Maddala (1983) chapter 6.
See Pennacchi (1988) for the simple derivation
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where r
e
is the cost (yield equivalent) of equity finance, rd is the cost of deposit finance, t
is the corporate tax rate, C is the bank's maximum debt-equity ratio, and p is the
required reserve ratio on deposits. Our empirical work assumes a corporate tax rate, t,
of 34%. Also, since most money center banks were near their maximum capital-asset
ratio of six percent when these loan sales were made, we assume .06 = 1/(1 - C)-
The bank's marginal cost of deposit funds is assumed to equal the LIBOR yield having
the same maturity as the loan, a measure that was provided to us along with the loan
sales data. Since LIBOR is a nearly risk-free market rate, we assume it is equivalent to
the quantity r
f
in our model. The bank's effective reserve requirement on deposits, p, is
assumed to be three percent, the amount of reserves required on non-personal time
deposits such as large Certificates of Deposit. The bank's cost of equity funds, r
e,
is
probably the most difficult rate to recover. In our empirical work, we make alternative
assumptions that it equals the risk free rate, r^ or a constant spread over the risk free
rate, where this spread or "bank equity premium" is assumed to be .07, approximately the
average difference between the rate of return on S&P 500 stocks and Treasury bills.
The method of computing the bank's solvency probability, p, is outlined in the
Appendix. It is computed in a manner similar to the analysis of Gorton and Pennacchi
(1989) who show how the risk of the bank can be inferred from bank stock prices.
The estimation of the Tobit model in equation (12) was carried out by nesting it in
the following more general model:
^(V) = ao + aM z—H + <*2mi-yp) + n ^ (15)
Equation (12) restricts aQ=0, aj = l, and a2 =-l. The results of estimating equation (15) is
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given in Table 5.
Table 5 presents parameter estimates under the hypothesis that the bank makes the
same level of guarantee, y, on all loans sold. Columns (1) through (3) give estimates of
the Tobit model specified in equation (12) assuming that the cost of bank equity, re,
equals the risk free rate, r
f
. In columns (1) and (5) we restrict the constant term to have
a zero mean, while in column (3) y (and a2 ) was restricted to equal zero, as would be
the case if no implicit guarantee was given by the bank to loan buyers. In each of the
first three columns, the estimated value of aj was approximately 0.6. Its standard error
implies that it is significantly different from zero at the 10% level, and one can not reject
the hypothesis that it equals its theoretical value of one. However, in each of the cases
in which estimates were obtained for y and a2 , their standard errors were very large,
implying that they were not significantly different from zero. In the fourth and fifth
columns of Table 5, the model was re-estimated assuming that the bank equity premium
was 7 per cent. Whether the error term in the model was assumed to equal zero
(column 4) or not (column 5) did not appear to make much of a qualitative difference.
In each case the parameter estimate of a± was approximately 1.3 and significantly
different from zero at the 10% level, but not significantly different from its theoretical
value of one. However, as in the case when the equity premium was assumed to be zero,
the estimated values of y and a2 have such large standard errors, that one cannot reject
the hypothesis that they equal zero.
In summary, the results of this section's tests provide some evidence that the bank
retains a fraction of the loans it originates in the same manner that would be predicted
from our optimizing model. However, under the assumption that the bank offers the
same level of an implicit guarantee on each loan that it sells, we find no significant
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evidence that any guarantee is being given. We now consider the case in which the bank
is assumed to possibly give a different level of implicit guarantee on each loan it sells.
B) Different Guarantees on Loan Sales
When the bank is assumed to be able to commit to different levels of implicit
guarantees on the different loans that it sells, it will optimize using equation (5) in
addition to equation (11). Using equation (5) to substitute for (1-yp) in equation (11),
and rearranging, one obtains:
*'(Y) + e -
<>V(e£-|0[l+e-e -"'-'-*
-n/Z,] (16)
e<-
fr'-r>*-
li/i
To solve for the optimal level of the loan guarantee as a function of the loan sold, we
need to specify the form of the marginal guarantee cost, k'(y)» on the left hand side of
(16). Since a necessary condition for an interior solution is that the cost function be
convex, we assume a simple quadratic form, k(y) = k^ + kjy + V2k2Y • Solving for y in
equation (16) then gives:
feVOi-nXue-, -<'*-*') (17)
Under the assumption that the optimal level of the loan guarantee is strictly less
than 1, so that € can be assumed to equal zero for all loans, we can transform equation
(11) along with equation (17) into a Tobit model. The transformation is again that of
equation (12) above, except that y on the right hand side of (12a) can be replaced with
23
its optimal level given by equation (17). However, since y is a function of b , b will
appear on the right hand side of equation (12a) as well as on the left hand side. In
principle, this equation could be solved for b in terms of the other variables and
parameters, but this involves solving a cubic equation in b. This would make estimation
of the parameters kj and k2 rather difficult, since the roots of this equation would be a
mixture of real and complex numbers depending on the parameter values. However,
Tobit model estimates of the cost function parameters can still be obtained without
uniquely solving for b. This can be done by using only those observations for which b is
strictly less than 1. (Note \i will equal zero.) In this case the latent variable is always
observed, i.e., bj=bj*. Therefore, this model can be estimated as a standard Tobit model
that is truncated (both Zj and bj are unobserved) at ln(bj)=0. The results of carrying out
this estimation is given in Table 6.
Of the 872 loan sales observations in our sample, 360 of these were sales in which
the originating bank retained a positive share of the loan, i.e., 0<b<l. This subset of
observations was used to produce the estimates in Table 6, where column (1) provides
estimates assuming a zero bank equity premium, and column (2) provides estimates
assuming a 7 percent bank equity premium. The size of the assumed equity premium
does not appear to affect the qualitative results. Basically, all of the relevant parameter
estimates have large standard errors, so that none are significantly different from zero.
Hence, these results provide no evidence of any implicit bank guarantees.
If we use the point estimates for kj and k2 given in Table 6, we can calculate the
implied value of the bank's implicit guarantee for each observation using equation (17).
Summary statistics of these calculations are given at the bottom of Table 6. What we
find is that the implied levels of implicit guarantees are all negative. When a zero equity
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premium is assumed, the average value of y is -5.341. For a 7 percent equity premium,
Y averages -.348. Of course, since the point estimates for kj and k2 have such large
standard errors, these implied values of y provide little or no information about bank
behavior. Hence the results of this section's empirical tests provide no indications of the
implicit mechanisms used to market loans.
V. Technological Progress and Tests of Observability
The previous tests provide little evidence that loan buyers expect to receive implicit
guarantees by the loan selling bank. However, there is some weak evidence that the
proportion of the loan retained by the originating bank contributes, at least partially, to
incentive compatibility. Still, it appears that there is sufficient scope for an alternative
(perhaps complementary) explanation for the emergence of this market.
A critical assumption of the model presented above is that loan buyers could make
the loan selling bank commit to some level of guarantee or force the bank to retain a
portion of the loan. But, as mentioned earlier, there is nothing in the participation
contract which explicitly states that the loan selling bank is committing to give a
guarantee or that the bank is restricted from selling the entire loan. Hence, it is not
apparent how either of these implicit mechanisms could be enforced. Since these implicit
contractual features would require market forces to insure the loan selling bank's
commitment, the possibility of a change in contracting technology that now makes this
possible must be considered.
Various sources of indirect evidence suggest that significant changes affecting the
underlying contracting technology have occurred. While it is difficult to measure
precisely, the tremendous advances in computer technology and telecommunications
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during the past two decades have undoubtedly led to a drastic reduction in the cost of
gathering, analyzing, and transmitting information. This is not to say that this lower cost
of collecting and disseminating information has reduced information asymmetries
between all borrowers and investors in the economy by equal amounts. One would
expect that institutional investors who acquired the necessary computer and
telecommunications technologies would have benefitted more than most individual
investors. Intermediaries such as commercial banks, thrifts, mutual funds, insurance
companies, and pension funds were likely to be most affected by this technological
progress, in part because they were positioned to benefit by economies of scope from
investing in computers and telecommunications. Computer and telecommunications
systems are vital to lowering the cost of banks' and thrifts' transactions services, the cost
of mutual funds' servicing of shareholder's accounts, the cost of insurance companies'
accounting and analysis of customers' risks, and the cost of pension funds' servicing their
participants' accounts.
A) Informal Evidence of Technological Change
If institutional investors have benefitted most from technologies that have reduced
information costs, one would expect that they should hold a large proportion of those
assets where information acquisition would be critical to valuation. High yield bonds or
"junk" bonds are assets that would appear to fit into this category. The junk bond
market grew dramatically during the 1980s. Prior to 1981, annual new issues were less
than $1.5 billion, but peaked to over $30 billion new issues in 1986, and settling in the
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range of $25 to $30 billion through the end of the decade. Importantly, as of year
end 1988, three quarters of the stock of junk bonds were held by insurance companies,
money managers, mutual funds, or pension funds. Individual investors owned only 5
percent of the stock of junk bonds.
Given that financial institutions have invested relatively greater amounts in
information technology and have therefore experienced relatively greater reductions in
information costs, what effect would this have on bank lending? First, if other financial
institutions can directly acquire information about borrowers at low cost, there should be
less need for banks to provide information production and monitoring services for many
borrowers. Banks' comparative advantage in eliminating duplication of information
services or free-riding problems by multiple investors is likely to be reduced when these
multiple investors have low costs of information acquisition. Therefore, if regulations
such as reserve and capital requirements increase the costs of funds of banks who already
must pay competitive rates for deposit and equity financing, these banks would become
uncompetitive as a source of financing for many borrowers. The previously mentioned
growth in the junk bond market might reflect this phenomenon. There is also evidence
that banks' comparative advantage has been reduced even more at the other end of the
debt risk spectrum. The ratio of nonbank commercial paper to banks' commercial and
industrial loans rose from less than 10 percent in 1959 to over 75 percent in 1989,
indicating a migration of large and medium sized corporations from bank financing to
See Becketti (1990) for more description of recent developments in the junk bond
market.
These figures are from U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (1990). For
purposes of comparison, statistics from the Federal Reserve Bulletin show that individual
investors held more that 10% of all outstanding Treasury securities as of year-end 1988.
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publicly issued securities.
Second, even if many financial institutions could not directly acquire information
about certain classes of borrowers at low cost, they may be able to inexpensively verify
the information collected by another bank regarding these borrowers. Hence we might
expect that individual financial institutions could verify the accurate production of credit
information and monitoring by a bank wishing to sell a single loan that it has originated.
This would explain the ability of banks to sell single commercial and industrial loans to
other institutions. To take this idea a step further, if we make the logical assumption
that banking institutions, being in the same line of business as a loan selling bank, are
able to verify the credit analysis and monitoring of the loan selling bank at lower cost
than nonbank financial institutions, this would explain why over three-fourths of loan
buyers are other banks.
B) An Empirical Test of Observability in the Loan Sales Market
A final test is performed that provides some evidence of the ability of loan buyers
to verify the monitoring performance of a loan selling bank. Recalling the model
described in the previous section, note that the incentive compatibility constraint,
equation l(i), makes the assumption that the bank's level of monitoring is not directly
observable by the loan buyer. If monitoring were observable, the bank and loan buyer
could contract to set the level of monitoring at its most efficient level, namely the level
which would satisfy equation l(i) where b=0, i.e., the level of monitoring the bank would
choose if it had not sold the loan. Therefore, the possibility of the loan buyers having
See Gorton and Pennacchi (1990A,B) for the theoretical rationale and empirical
evidence of a shift from bank financing to direct financing.
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the ability to verify the loan selling bank's performance produces the following effect.
x = , if monitoring unobserved. (18a)
l-bil-yp)
x
a
= c, if monitoring observed. (18b)
This suggests that a direct empirical test of the incentive compatibility constraint might
be able to shed light on the question of whether or not bank monitoring of borrowers is
observable by loan buyers. If we again assume the functional form given by equation (8),
we find that
i -(riM~rdx
X. - ?L^-^- <19>
l-yp
Substituting equation (19) into equation (18a) and rearranging, we arrive at
P
c
-
l
-=3E— (20)
The left hand side of equation (20) equals the loan specific parameter /3 which is a
measure of a given loan's benefit from greater monitoring. On the right hand side are
two multiplicative ratios. The first, which is independent of the fraction of the loan sold,
b, and the fraction of the loan guaranteed, y, is the relationship between the loan sale
yield, r^, and /3 that would hold if monitoring were observable. The second term on the
right hand side denotes the effect of unobservability. We propose to test the relationship
given in equation (20) using the borrower's commercial paper rating as an instrument for
/3j. The empirical relationship that we test is in the following log form:
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ln(P.) = fll ln[
C
——\ + fl
2
ln[
*" Y/?
] + v. (21)
L(l-e"
(r
" ^) 1-^(1 -YP)
where aj is a parameter that should equal 1 if the model is correctly specified, a2 is a
parameter that should equal 1 if monitoring is unobservable and should equal if
monitoring is observable, and v, is assumed to be a normally distributed, independent
error term.
Equation (21) was estimated as a probit model using 334 of the 872 loan sale
observations for which the borrower reported a commercial paper rating. The
borrower's commercial paper rating was assumed to be a discrete measure of the its
benefit from bank monitoring. It was assumed that the fraction of the loan guaranteed
(if any) was the same for all loan sales, so that y was treated as a parameter.
The results of this estimation are given in Table 7. Column (1) gives estimates of
the parameters in equation (21) while column (2) does the same but restricts a2 and y to
equal zero. In either case, the estimate of aj is of the correct sign and significantly
different from zero. However, it is also significantly different from its theoretical value of
1, suggesting some degree of model misspecification. In column (1), the estimated value
of y seems reasonable, but the estimate of a2 is of the wrong sign. Both estimates have
huge standard errors, so that they are not significantly different from zero. Hence, the
results present no evidence of unobservability in monitoring. Perhaps the significant sign
of the coefficient aj might suggest that the monitoring of the loan selling bank is partially
observable to loan buyers.
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VI. Concluding Remarks
To investigate the possibility of implicit features combined in commercial and
industrial loan sale contracts, we specified and estimated an optimizing model of bank
and loan buyer behavior. Our empirical tests required making assumptions on the
specific form of the bank's monitoring technology and the form of the bank's expected
cost of giving implicit guarantees. Whether or not these functional forms are reasonable
approximations of reality is difficult to verify. However, if these assumptions can be
trusted, our results indicate that there is little reason to believe that the bank selling the
loans in our sample is giving implicit guarantees to loan buyers. This conclusion is
invariant to the alternative initial assumption that the bank makes equal guarantees or
different guarantees on the loans it sells.
The equilibrium behavior of the fraction of the loan sold by the bank is somewhat
consistent with our model. Assuming the bank gives no guarantees on loans sold, our
results are in general agreement with the model's implication that the share of the loan
sold is a decreasing function of the spread between the loan sale yield and LIBOR. This
is evidence that certain types of loans may not be perfectly liquid, but that the bank must
continue to convince loan buyers of its commitment to monitoring borrowers by taking a
share of the loan's risk.
Technological change appears to have played an important role in the opening of
the loan sales market. Our tests suggest that the monitoring of borrowers by the loan
selling bank may now be observable by loan buyers. While this development is not yet
well-understood, it would seem to have an important impact on the way banking is
conducted.
The existence of well-functioning markets for bank assets, like those which appear
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to be developing, does not mean that intermediation per se is ending. All the
explanations for loan sales considered above imply that banks still offer services for
certain classes of borrowers that cannot be obtained in capital markets via issuance of
open market securities. The loan sales contracts mean, however, that it is no longer
necessary for banks to hold loans until maturity, risking their equity during the life of the
asset created.
If bank loans can be sold in fairly liquid markets, then the rationale for bank
regulation is called into question since it is fundamentally based on the illiquidity of bank
assets. Deposit insurance was, at least originally, aimed at providing the public with a
circulating medium which did not expose people to losses either due to better informed
traders or because of banking panics. If markets for bank assets open, the market
incompleteness necessitating government intervention would seem to be gone. While the
loan sales market is sizeable, it is by no means clear that the requisite volume of bank
assets are marketable.
There is, however, abundant evidence that the demand for bank provision of these
services has fallen. The rise of the commercial paper market and the medium term note
market suggest that the same technological forces which make loan sales feasible have
allowed directly marketable instruments to compete more effectively with bank loans.
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Appendix
This appendix outlines the method used to calculate the bank's solvency probability,
p. Similar to Marcus and Shaked (1984), we assumed that the equilibrium value of bank
equity can be modeled as a Black-Scholes call option:
e
t
= a
t
N(d
x
) - N(d2) (A.1)
where e
t
is the market value of bank equity per dollar of bank liabilities, a
t
is the market
value of bank assets per dollar or bank liabilities, and dj and d2 equal:
ln(a,)+ 1/2G2T __
</, =
'
_
'
,
d
2
=d
x
-o
e^
(A.2)
where cr is the variance of the rate of return on bank assets and r
e
is the time until the
next bank examination. Given the value of bank equity in (A.l), Ito's lemma implies that
the instantaneous standard deviation of the rate of return on bank equity, cr
et ,
is given by:
C = "^ (A.3)
et
affidJ-NidJ
We used a time series of daily values of e
t
as well as an estimate of the standard
deviation of the rate of return on equity, cr
e ,
computed over the period January 1987
through September 1988, to infer daily values of a
t
and a. This was done by numerically
solving the nonlinear system of equations (A.l) and (A.3).
Given that we now had an estimate of the bank's market value of assets to liability
ratio for any date between January 1987 and September 1988, we could compute the
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probability at the time that a loan was sold that the bank would remain solvent until the
loan's maturity date. This was done by making the (risk-neutral) assumption that the
expected rate of return on bank assets and liabilities were both equal to the risk free
rate. Taking the (theoretically constant) value of a to be the average of our estimates,
then the probability of the bank's solvency at date t+r given that its asset to liability ratio
equals a
t
at date t is:
.1.
,.J«1*^I) (A.4)
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Table 1
Quarterly Outstanding Loan Sales of Commercial Banks*
($ billions)
Date Loan Sales Loan Purchases
1983Q2 26.7 -
Q3 268 -
Q4 29.1 -
1984Q1 32.8 -
Q2 33.3 -
Q3 35.5 -
Q4 50.2 -
1985Q1 54.6 -
Q2 59.9 -
Q3 77.5 -
Q4 75.7 -
1986Q1 65.4 -
Q2 81.2 -
Q3 91.3 -
Q4 111.8 -
1987Q1 162.9 -
Q2 195.2 -
Q3 188.9 -
Q4 198.0 -
1988Q1 236.3 16.64
Q2 248.4 16.22
Q3 263.0 17.65
Q4 286.8 19.29
1989Q1 272.7 16.16
Q2 276.5 18.20
Q3 290.9 17.82
Q4 258.7 19.89
1990Q1 228.3 16.07
Q2 190.2 15.94
*Sales reported are gross and exclude sales of consumer loans and mortgage
loans. Also excluded are loans subject to repurchase agreements or with
recourse to the seller.
Source: FD1C Call Reports, Schedule L.
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Table 2
Description of Data
Variable Mean
Standard
Deviation
Minimum Maximum
1) Maturity of the Loan (days) 28.04 22.45 1.00 277.0
2) Maturity of the Loan Sate (days) 27.63 22.44 1.00 277.0
3) Fraction of Loan Sold 0.76 0.30 0.09 1.00
4) LIBOR Rate 7.29 0.57 6.19 8.75
5) Loan Sale Rate 7.41 0.59 6.28 9.12
6) Loan Rate 7.53 0.61 6.25 9.18
7) Probability of Bank Failure 0.000047 0.000625 0.00 0.0171
Sample Period: January 20, 1987 - September 1, 1988.
Number of Observations: 872.
Source: Money Center Bank.
1 1 1 9 3
.1 .1 .1 1.0 .3
1.8 .3 7.9 4.9 8.1
8 34 27 20 3
.9 3.9 3.1 2.3 .3
38.1 11.6 8.6 10.8 13.6
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Table 3
Summary of the Data: Loan Sales Size, Rating, and Maturity
Rating Maturity (days)
0-5 6-15 16-30 31-60 61-90 90:
Al±
Avg. Si zeof Loan Sale 5.0 5.0 25.0 28.3 41.2
(Smillions)
Number of Observations
% of All Observations
% of Ob s er v at i ons of
Same Maturity
Al
Avg. Si zeof Loan Sale 28.8 25.8 29.1 35.6 8.2
(Smillions)
Number of Observations
% of All Observations
% of Ob s er v at i ons of
Same Maturity
A2
Avg. Si7e of Loan Sale 15.8 13.6 12.9 20.4 21.6 19.2
(Smillions)
Number of Observations
% of All Observations
% of Ob s er v at i ons of
Same Maturity
A3
Avg. Si zeof Loan Sale 11.7 15.9 18.8 20.0
(Smillions)
Number of Observations
% of All Observations
% of Ob s er v at i ons of
Same Maturity
NR
Avg. Si zeof Loan Sale 16.1 110 13.4 18.9 15.8 14.9
(Smillions)
Number of Observations
% of All Observations
% of Ob s er v at i ons of
Same Maturity
3 41 73 64 18 9
.3 4.7 8.4 7.4 2.1 1.0
14.3 14.0 23.2 34.6 48.6 40.9
3 8 4 1
.3 .9 .5 .1
1.0 2.5 2.2 2.7
9 210 206 88 15 10
1.0 24.1 23.6 10.1 1.7 1.1
42.9 71.9 65.4 47.6 40.5 45.5
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Table A
Summary of the Data: Yield Spreads (in basis points) and Fraction of Loan Sold
Rating Maturity (days)
0-5 6-15 16-30 31-60 61-90 90;
Al±
R
LS " RLIBOR basis ptS
RB " RLIBOR basis pts -
Average Fraction Sold
Number of Observations
Al
R
LS " RLIBOR basis pts -
RB ~ RLIBOR basis pts -
Average Fraction Sold
Number of Observations
A2
RLS" RLIBOR basis Pts -
Rp ~~ Ry Ttjf)p> basis pts.
Average Fraction Sold
Number of Observations
A3
R
LS " RLIBOR basis pts -
RB~ RLIBOR basis Pts -
Average Fraction Sold
Number of Observations
R
LS " RLIBOR basis pts -
RB" RLIBOR basis Pts -
Average Fraction Sold
Number of Observations
-
.5 -2.0 -7.0 .4 -3.3
-6.5 0.0 -5.0 18.6 60.8 —
1
1
1
1
1
1
.843
9
.556
3
3.9 -1.4 -3.5 1.9 _ 6.0
12.4 2.9 8.9 1.8 — 30.4
.917
8
.867
34
.746
27
.455
20
1
3
4.8 4.7 3.1 5.8 10.5 12.7
5.1 6.2 9.1 18.4 23.1 22.9
.733
3
.826
41
.810
73
.746
64
.600
18
.608
9
_ 17.5 12.7 12.0 17.5
— "22.8 15.7 14.6 25.0 —
.778
3
.771
8
.625
4
1
1
8.3 18.0 15.8 16.1 17.1 17.7
35.2 31.4 31.1 26.7 30.3 51.0
.889
9
.784
210
.738
206
.703
88
.707
15
.750
10
4b
Table 5
Parameter Estimates Assuming Bank Gives
Equal Guarantees on All Loan Sales
Dependent Variable : Log of Fraction of Loan Sold
Number of Observations: 872
8e"
Cvr*
ln(V) = ao + aM ;—
H
+ ajad-vp) + ti,
Tobit Model Parameter Estimates
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Parameters
(1)
ep=0
(2)
ep=0
(3)
ep =
(4)
ep=.07
(5)
ep=.07
a 10.1886
(2113.44)
.83380
(.10794)
10.57055
(2324.74)
a
l
.59463
(.34609)
.60254
(.34447)
.59890
(.34416)
1.30229
(.78109)
1.31195
(.78073)
a2 1.18385
(271.6884)
-5.59434
(2517.72)
.50472
(25.881)
-6.06104
(2949.55)
Y .506687
(127.37)
.81218
(322.90)
.80840
(72.815)
.79941
(340.51)
Standard
Error
1.69070
(.19195)
1.68455
(.19058)
1.68499
(.19043)
1.68745
(.19106)
1.68707
(.19113)
- Log
Likelihood
838.93 838.88 838.93 839.16 839.11
Note: ep refers to the assumed equity premium used in computing
of bank internal finance, 8.
the excess cost
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Table 6
Parameter Estimates Assuming Bank May Give
Different Guarantees on Loan Sales
Dependent Variable : Log of Fraction of Loan Sold
Number of Observations : 360
\n(b
t
*) = a + fljln[-
i+e-e-^- 1*
] + c2ln(l -y *p) + r\ t
Qe-W
Tobit Model Parameter Estimates
Parameters
Regulatory Cost
Parameter k
Regulatory Cost
Parameter k2
Standard
Error
- Log Likelihood
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
(l)
nep=0 ep=.07
-.53355
(3.87253)
-.70868
(5.35174)
.00326
(.02547)
-.00702
(.05358)
.26724
(1.36110)
1.08310
(7.47424)
.01028
(.06360)
.00685
(.09711)
.00191
(.00130)
.01914
(.16057)
.16955
(.00134)
.16883
(.00137)
7631.58 -7627.73
Note: ep refers to the assumed equity premium used in computing the excess cost of
bank internal finance, 0.
Values of Loan Sale Guarantees Implied by k
1
and k2 Estimates
Mean of Sample
Standard Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
-5.341 -.348
.053 .011
-5.385 -.358
-4.938 -.270
k2
Table 7
Parameter Estimates of Incentive Compatibility Constraint
Dependent Variable : Log of Commercial Paper Rating
Number of Observations: 334
ln(p.) = fllln[
C
—
—
] + ajn[- l
~yp
] v,
1(1 -e"**"
1
^) 1-^1-YP)
Parameters
Probit Model Parameter Estimates
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
(i) (2)
.36692 .33910
(.05835) (.05503)
-.65856
(10.11244)
.55820
(4.67695)
Log Likelihood 283.03 285.03
Note: The borrower's commercial paper rating was assumed to be a discrete measure of
its of its benefit from monitoring as measured by /3. Commercial paper ratings were
translated as Al + =0, Al = l, A2=2, A3=3.
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